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VOLUME

5

Cybersecurity Research By SANS.edu Graduate Students



Ed Skoudis

President, SANS Technology Institute

We are super excited to share this latest issue of the SANS Technology Institute's Research Review Journal, chock full of fascinating, valuable, and highly practical research by our student scholars. With late-breaking and cutting-edge insights into the intersection of cybersecurity with a host of different technical spheres, including AI, Cloud, Cyber Defense, Digital Forensics, and even the human element of cybersecurity, these deeply researched articles are certain to keep your interest and make an indelible mark in the cybersecurity community. We're proud of our students and thankful for the contributions that they work so hard to make, all to serve the overall mission of building a safer, more secure world for us all.



Dr. Johannes Ullrich

Dean of Research, SANS Technology Institute

For our graduate students, research is an opportunity to show they are ready to handle "what's next." It extends what they learned into new domains that have yet to be fully explored. This year, this is most evident in the addition of a new section to our research journal: Artificial Intelligence. Our students demonstrated how they can take what they learned and extend it into this new domain. These papers offer practical advice anchored in our students' real-world experiences. Many of these papers emerged from problems our students had to solve as part of their jobs, and they show how what they learned was applied to real-world problems as soon as they completed a class.

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STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

Revolutionizing Cybersecurity: Implementing Large Language Models as Dynamic SOAR Tools

by Anthony Russo

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

This research explores the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs), explicitly using ChatGPT Actions as dynamic SOAR tools to address evolving cybersecurity threats. Traditional SOAR systems, though effective, demand significant time and resources for development and maintenance. The study evaluates their ability to autonomously detect, analyze, and respond to threats by integrating LLMs into a controlled environment and simulating various cybersecurity incidents. Findings reveal that LLM-driven SOAR tools reduce development time, enhance response effectiveness, and improve communication clarity. However, challenges such as continuous model updates and staff training were noted. This research provides a framework for implementing LLM-driven SOAR tools, highlighting their transformative potential in cybersecurity operations and suggesting areas for further study.

“There is interest in Large Language Models (LLMs) and their potential benefit in the information security field. During this research, Anthony Russo explores LLMs, and explicitly using ChatGPT Actions as dynamic SOAR tools to address evolving cybersecurity threats. He looks at the possibilities to detect, analyze and respond to threats by integrating LLMs, and the benefits of implementing such a solution.”

– TANYA BACCAM,
FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR

Alert Analysis: TCP SYN Scan Detected on Port 22 (SSH)

Alert Details:

- **Alert Type:** TCP SYN Scan
- **Timestamp:** May 21, 12:34:56
- **Source IP:** 172.16.0.1
- **Target Port:** 22 (SSH)

Enrichment:

Using VirusTotal to enrich the IP address data for 172.16.0.1.

VirusTotal Analysis:

- **IP Address:** 172.16.0.1
- **Analysis Result:** [Pending, as this is a local IP address not likely to be in public threat intelligence databases]

Technical Analysis:

A TCP SYN scan is indicative of reconnaissance activity where an attacker is probing to identify open ports on a target system. The scan specifically targeting port 22 (SSH) suggests that the attacker may be looking for SSH services to exploit.

Impact Assessment:

- **Confidentiality:** If the attacker gains access to the SSH service, sensitive data could be compromised.
- **Integrity:** Unauthorized access to SSH could lead to system modifications or unauthorized changes.
- **Availability:** Successful exploitation of SSH vulnerabilities could lead to Denial of Service (DoS) or further exploitation attempts.

Advanced Analysis:

Further investigation through network traffic analysis and historical data correlation is required to determine if this scan is part of a broader campaign.

Event Correlation:

Check historical logs to see if there have been other scanning activities from this IP or similar patterns of reconnaissance.

FIGURE 7: CUSTOMGPT NETWORK PAYLOAD AND INITIAL ANALYSIS

Safeguarding AI: Effectiveness of Guardrails in Controlling Malicious Output from Locally Hosted LLMs

by Jared McWherter

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

As the capabilities of locally hosted Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, the risk of threat actors using these models to generate malicious content increases. Cloud-hosted LLMs such as OpenAI's ChatGPT and Anthropic's Claude have made significant efforts to prevent misuse using safety mechanisms, including guardrail systems, content filtering, and real-time monitoring of potential flagged misuse. However, locally hosted LLMs are not typically designed with the same safety mechanisms, and potential misuse cannot be identified due to the LLM running on a local machine. This paper explores the effectiveness of open-source guardrails that can be added to LLM-based conversational applications to mitigate the threat of potential misuse. A locally hosted LLM will be instructed to generate malicious content such as malware, phishing attacks, and misinformation to identify a baseline of the current capabilities and then subsequently test the same content generation against the LLMs with various guardrail configurations. Prompt engineering techniques will be utilized to identify potential vulnerabilities in the guardrail configurations and evaluate if the guardrails can be bypassed. The results of this research will provide critical insight into the current potential malicious capabilities of locally hosted LLMs and assess if the available guardrail solutions can mitigate misuse.




FIGURE 6: PHISHING EMAIL - GUARDRAILS

Machine Learning: Preventing Network Abnormalities

by Chad Mascari

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The Department of Defense (DoD) developed and published multiple zero trust documents describing the zero trust principles that DoD organizations should achieve. The documents state that organizations will need to rely on Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, and automation to reduce the time a security practitioner needs to monitor, detect, and prevent unauthorized user and device access to network resources. The DoD operates endpoint devices and networks disconnected from the public internet, driving a need for disconnected machine learning models. The research paper outlines the potential for an on-premises machine learning algorithm at the endpoint device to analyze normal and abnormal network traffic and automatically implement Windows Defender Firewall rulesets. The research outlines the challenges to implementing this concept at the endpoint device instead of relying on centralized or cloud-based machine learning platforms.




FIGURE 5: SYSTEM'S CPU UTILIZATION DURING TEST 1

Leveraging Generative Artificial Intelligence for Memory Analysis

by William L. Copeland Jr. [READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The increasing sophistication of malware poses significant challenges for traditional memory analysis techniques in digital forensics. This research explores the potential of leveraging Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) models, specifically OpenAI’s GPT-4 Turbo and Anthropic’s Claude 3 Opus, to enhance malware detection in memory. By combining the data extraction capabilities of the Volatility Framework with the predictive power of Generative AI, this study aims to develop an innovative approach for accurately identifying and classifying malicious activities in memory dumps. The research methodology involves collecting a diverse set of memory dump samples, preprocessing the data using Volatility plugins, and evaluating the performance of the AI models using quantitative metrics.

The findings highlight the potential of Generative AI models in effectively identifying malware while revealing limitations and areas for improvement. The implications suggest that Generative AI models can serve as valuable complementary tools alongside traditional malware detection methods, and future research recommendations include expanding datasets, developing domain-specific models, and integrating Generative AI capabilities into existing memory forensics workflows. This study lays the foundation for further exploration and advancement of Generative AI models in-memory analysis and malware detection.

Open AI GPT-4 Turbo	
True Positives (TP)	4
True Negatives (TN)	0
False Positives (FP)	2
False Negatives (FN)	0
Total Samples	6

Anthropic Claud3 Opus	
True Positives (TP)	6
True Negatives (TN)	0
False Positives (FP)	0
False Negatives (FN)	0
Total Samples	6

Accuracy	0.6666667
False Positive Rate	1
False Negative Rate	0

Accuracy	1
False Positive Rate	0
False Negative Rate	0

FIGURE 7: ACCURACY AND ERROR RATES

Shining a Light on AI: Ensuring Vendor Transparency in Data Sourcing and Delivery

by Brian Mohr

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Amidst the proliferation of AI solutions, the focus lies in evaluating transparency, undisclosed system modifications, and data exfiltration within the privacy policies of vendors providing desktop applications, browser plug-ins, and browser-only AI solutions. Specifically, the research investigates whether these terms of service provide clear information regarding data collection practices and whether there is any deviation from the documented procedures, focusing on whether excessive data is sent to the AI system. This research expands upon prior work, emphasizing the need to mention spyware in End User License Agreements (EULAs). Doing so offers a broader perspective on data privacy and system transparency in various AI solutions. It contributes to a better understanding of their implications and promotes trust and accountability in the AI ecosystem.




FIGURE 16: GRAMMARLY EXTENSION OPERATION TESTING PROCESS

STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

The Cost of Container Runtime Security

by Luke Stigdon

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Containerization has fundamentally changed how applications are developed, deployed, and managed. Containers provide a lightweight, portable alternative to traditional virtual machines and their associated infrastructure. Unfortunately, containers provide less isolation than virtual machines, which has led to security trade-offs that organizations must consider. Various runtimes and tools have emerged to bring added layers of security to containerized environments. This paper aims to analyze the performance cost these tools incur. Through an analysis of existing methods and a comprehensive set of benchmarks and metrics, this paper will explore the benefits – and drawbacks – of runtime security tools and container sandboxes. By analyzing and understanding the inner workings of the available tools, administrators, and developers can make informed decisions about how they build their infrastructure. Additionally, this paper will highlight areas of future research and discuss evolved challenges in container security.




FIGURE 3: NGINX REQUEST PER SECOND

“Containers offer many advantages when deploying software. They offer additional security, easier deployment options, and simplify the application life cycle. But as with all tools, they must be configured properly to take full advantage of the security features. Luke’s research stood out for his detailed and thorough approach to investigating the cost and performance of some of these options. Performance impact is often used as an argument against improving security without investigating the exact impact. Many decisions have been made based on anecdotal evidence. Luke’s paper provides the missing quantitative details needed to make a proper risk-based decision.”

– DR. JOHANNES ULLRICH, FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR


Kubernetes: Micro-Segmentation for Kubernetes Instantiated Ephemeral Workloads

by Kenneth Huss

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Defensive security professionals will have to commit focused energy and resources to protect Kubernetes instantiated ephemeral workloads and not leave it solely in the hands of the company's development team. This paper examines the reasons behind the emergence and popularity of microservice-based application development, the risks these workloads pose to the security posture, and whether scalable micro-segmentation of container-based workloads can be a practical part of a Zero Trust Architectural strategy.

Micro-segmentation can hinder lateral movement into data center assets outside Kubernetes domains and slow attackers, allowing security teams to detect that movement. The Kubernetes cluster is inside a development enclave, and workloads with external cluster connectivity should not be allowed to form connections with the production network assets. A slingshot workstation inside the production enclave will scan and test connectivity between enclaves. Cisco Secure Workload will be used to segment and stop the traffic flow between these enclaves. Nmap scanning tools will be used to observe the efficacy of micro-segmentation.



Never Trust, Always Verify: Analysis of Zero Trust Best Practices for Conditional Access

by Glenn Andal

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The rise in advanced persistent threats (APTs) requires more robust security measures to protect an organization's sensitive data. This study examines the effectiveness of Microsoft Entra's Conditional Access policies in thwarting adversarial bypass attempts, particularly in light of vulnerabilities exposed by recent high-profile breaches, such as those involving the Lapsus\$ hacking group. These incidents have highlighted the need for more resilient security frameworks, especially concerning traditional multifactor authentication (MFA) systems. Through comprehensive testing, this research evaluates the strengths and limitations of various Conditional Access policies in addressing MFA attacks. It identifies potential enhancements to improve their robustness within a Zero Trust framework. The findings provide practical insights into the current capabilities of Microsoft Entra Conditional Access and offer recommendations for organizations seeking to strengthen their identity and access management (IAM) strategies against evolving cyber threats.




FIGURE 1: AZURE TEST ENVIRONMENT

Antivirus Detection of Containerized Malware in Linux Distributions

by Emily Stevenson

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The use of containers exploded in popularity over the past decade and has exponential growth forecasted for years to come. There is a significant shortage of current research and documentation regarding antivirus detection of malware within container architectures, especially considering their prevalence in today's market. Understanding current capabilities is critical in network defense and building defense-in-depth strategies, as is understanding existing vulnerabilities and security blind spots. The research presented in this paper explores the effectiveness of antivirus software at detecting a malicious payload obfuscated only by its presence within container architecture.

	VM A		VM B	
	Binary At Rest	Executed Binary	Binary At Rest	Executed Binary
ClamAV	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sophos	✗	✗	✓	✓
Rootkit Hunter	✗	✗	✗	✗
ESET	✗	✓	✓	✓
Bitdefender	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kaspersky	✓	✓	✓	✓

FIGURE 34: TABLE OF FINDINGS

STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

QUIC-Tun: QUIC Firewall Evasion

by John Hoehne

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The QUIC protocol is designed to focus on user privacy, which can cause significant implications for network security teams trusted to protect intellectual property. The security community's reaction to QUIC has primarily focused on blocking it due to its prohibitive nature for midpoint verification of users' activities. However, the primary method is inadequate, potentially leaving glaring holes in their defenses. Adversaries can adapt tactics to abuse and evade these basic configurations and rules via simple, openly available tools. Intrusion prevention systems like SNORT are ill-equipped to prevent this vector from accessing critical systems or the easy exfiltration of intellectual property via QUIC.




FIGURE 4: LAB NETWORK LAYOUT

"QUIC traffic is notoriously difficult to identify on networks since it can be easily confused for normal HTTP(s) traffic. Attackers can leverage QUIC for data exfiltration, command and control (C2), remote host control, and other nefarious purposes. John's paper gives a nice overview of how the protocol works, demonstrates several examples of using QUIC-Tun for evil, and then discusses techniques for discovering and analyzing QUIC traffic. This information is critical for those tasked with designing or operating detective and preventive controls for networks."

– CLAY RISENHOOVER, FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR

Never Trust, Always Verify: Effectiveness of Endpoint Detection and Response Tools Versus Zero Trust Endpoint Controls in Enterprise Environments

by Agnel DSilva

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Threat actors are finding new ways to evade detection by exploiting built-in tools like Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINS), scripts, and libraries that bypass security measures such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems. Despite the effectiveness of EDR in mitigating cyber threats, adversaries continue to develop tactics to circumvent these defenses, often leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities. To counter these evolving threats, implementing default-deny policies through application allowlisting and ringfencing zero trust controls can significantly enhance endpoint security. Allowlisting ensures that only pre-approved applications can run, while ringfencing controls how these applications interact with other programs and the internet. Even though these measures aren't commonly used due to concerns about upkeep and possible productivity issues, they provide a strong defense against advanced cyber-attacks, helping to lower risks and improve response times.

MITRE ATT&CK ID	TACTIC	VIRTUAL MACHINES
TA0001	Initial Access	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0002	Execution	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0003	Persistence	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0004	Privilege Escalation	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0005	Defense Evasion	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0006	Credential Access	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0007	Discovery	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0008	Lateral Movement	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0009	Collection	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0011	Command & Control	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0010	Exfiltration	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL
TA0040	Impact	WIN11-DEF, WIN11-EDR, WIN11-TL

TABLE 1: TEST PLAN

Lack of Intentionality: Honeypots Show Us Wandering Drones

by Jesse La Grew

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Many honeypot studies focus on the trends, sources, and motivations behind recorded attacks. For organizations choosing hosting providers, it is compelling to understand any differences in the attacks between providers. Honeypots were deployed to multiple cloud environments, including Amazon Web Services (AWS), Digital Ocean, Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Microsoft Azure. These were compared with a residentially hosted honeypot to understand any differences between SSH, telnet, and web attacks. The data was processed to compare differences in attack volume, destination ports probed, terminal commands run, malware submitted, Uniform Resource Locator (URL) paths accessed, and credentials supplied for brute force access attempts. The information demonstrated that there are few differences between providers. Activity seen is a combination of automated scanning and botnet activity. There are some unique outliers seen in different target networks. The data highlights that addressing the primary cyber defenses may hold more significance than focusing on targeted attacks in a particular hosting environment.




FIGURE 8: LOG VOLUME DISTRIBUTION BY HONEYPOT

Revolutionizing Enterprise Security: The Exciting Future of Passkeys Beyond Passwords!

by Richard Greene

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

As digital threats grow increasingly sophisticated, traditional password-based authentication systems are proving inadequate, leaving enterprises vulnerable to phishing, credential stuffing, and other cyberattacks. In response, passkeys built on public key cryptography are emerging as a robust alternative, offering enhanced security, user convenience, and resilience against modern threats. This research explores the advantages and challenges of adopting passkeys as a primary authentication method in enterprise environments. It provides a comprehensive analysis of how passkeys mitigate common attack vectors, including phishing and brute-force attacks while reducing the operational burdens of password management. However, the transition to a passwordless future is not without hurdles. Issues such as user adoption, technical integration with legacy systems, and secure account recovery mechanisms are examined. Case studies and technical analysis highlight the real-world implications of passkey adoption, and the paper concludes with recommendations for overcoming these challenges. With a careful implementation strategy, passkeys represent a transformative step toward a more secure, efficient, and password-free enterprise.

```
1. Java Required
2. Google
3. Twitter

set:webattack> Select a template: 2

[*] Cloning the website: http://www.google.com
[*] This could take a little bit ...

The best way to use this attack is if username and password form fields are available. Regardless, this captures all POSTs on a website.
[*] The Social-Engineer Toolkit Credential Harvester Attack
[*] Credential Harvester is running on port 80
[*] Information will be displayed to you as it arrives below:
192.168.58.129 - - [19/Nov/2024 16:29:15] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[*] WE GOT A HIT! Printing the output:
PARAM: GALX=SJLCKfgaqoM
PARAM: continue=https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?zt=ChRsWFBwd2JmV1hIcDhtUFdlzBENhIfVWsxSTdNLW9MdThibW1TMFQzVUZFc1BBaURUWmI
RSQ%E2%88%99APs8z4gAAAAUy4_qD7Hbfz38w8kxnaNouLcRiD3YTjX
PARAM: service=lso
PARAM: dsh=-7381887106725792428
PARAM: _utf8=â
PARAM: bgresponse=js_disabled
PARAM: pstMsg=1
PARAM: dnConn=
PARAM: checkConnection=
PARAM: checkedDomains=youtube
POSSIBLE USERNAME FIELD FOUND: Email=richard.greene.83@gmail.com
POSSIBLE PASSWORD FIELD FOUND: Passwd=@9ETBQ`yhbDjP4nG25!5z*hHBby2Em7Q
PARAM: signIn=SignIn
PARAM: PersistentCookie=yes
[*] WHEN YOU'RE FINISHED, HIT CONTROL-C TO GENERATE A REPORT.
```

FIGURE 3: THE SUCCESSFUL HARVEST OF THE USER'S CREDENTIALS

The Proof is in the Pudding: EDR Configuration Versus Ransomware

by Benjamin Powell

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Each Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool is slightly different in its functions and operations but is similar in its goal. Can an analysis of the methodology be completed to arm network defenders with the ability to prove the configuration of the EDR through empirical testing of the tool? Defender for Business and Wazuh will be deployed and mimicked ransomware attacks will be conducted. For a simulated attack, Akira Ransomware activity and Atomic Red Team atomic tests were mapped to MITRE ATT&CK from TA001: Initial Access through TA040: Impact. Testing was performed where Akira and the Atomic Red Team overlapped. Previous research completed by Karantzas, G., & Patsakis, C. in 2021 and Adam Fowler in 2023 proves that EDR tools in a default state will prevent and detect some attacks. Their research does not delve into the configuration of the tools themselves. Looking for commonalities in EDR configurations can increase network defenders' understanding of tool operations, allowing for additional expertise in alert remediation.

Tactic and Test	1=Failed	X=Success	Window Popup	
TA0040: Impact	Defender		Wazuh	
T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact	Windows 11	Server 2022	Windows 11	Server 2022
Atomic Test 5: PureLocker Ransom Note	X	X	X	X
Atomic Test 10: Akira Ransomware drop Files with .akira Extension and Ransomnote	1	1	1	1
T1490: Inhibit System Recovery				
Manual Test: powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy Remove-WmiObject"	X	X	X	X
T1531: Account Access Removal				
Atomic Test 2: Delete User - Windows	X	X	X	X
T1489: Service Stop				
Atomic Test 1: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller	X	X	X	X
Atomic Test 2: Windows - Stop service using net.exe	X	X	X	X
Atomic Test 3: Windows - Stop service by killing process	X	X	X	X

FIGURE 15: IMPACT RESULTS

Securing the Future: How Memory-Safe Programming Languages Impact Industry Safety

by Christopher Ross

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

By analyzing CVE data and corresponding CVSS scores for various programming languages, this research seeks to identify patterns and draw conclusions about the effectiveness of memory safety mechanisms in mitigating security risks. This study aims to empirically evaluate whether programming languages designed with inherent memory safety features exhibit fewer and less severe vulnerabilities compared to those that do not. Preliminary findings suggest that memory-safe languages, which employ techniques such as garbage collection, bounds checking, and type safety, tend to report fewer critical vulnerabilities. This study has significant implications for software development practices and the selection of programming languages in security-sensitive applications. The results will guide developers and organizations in making informed decisions about language use, prioritizing those that enhance software security and reduce the likelihood of severe vulnerabilities.

Memory Safe Total Vulnerabilities





FIGURE 4: MEMORY SAFE TOTAL VULNERABILITIES

Memory Safety and Beyond: Unveiling the Missing Piece in Golang

by Anu Mathew

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Memory-safe languages are popular in modern industry, as they significantly reduce the attack surface of applications. These languages handle memory allocations and deallocations as runtime demands. Golang (Go), a popular memory-safe language among tech giants, powers the modern cloud industry. This study examines Go's default HTTP implementation while undergoing certain Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It will highlight the careful considerations necessary to write resilient endpoints in Go. Furthermore, the study will analyze DoS attacks and explore strategies to detect such attacks where Go is employed.



Securing the Web: Shortening TLS Certificate Lifespans for Enhanced Security

by Travis Friedrich

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Google has proposed changing the maximum validity period of TLS certificates from 398 to 90 days. This is a 77% reduction in lifetime, which impacts both technical and operational aspects of organizations. The potential impact of such a change is explored by scraping the internet for live certificates and exploring certificate transparency logs for revocation reasons within proposed timelines for further data analysis.

Data showed that much of the industry already uses certificates with 90-day lifetimes. It is an initiative-taking step, but Google's proposal suggests limiting certificate validity to 90 days and mandating an equivalent reduction in the domain validation reuse period. This approach promises multiple benefits, including frequent domain validation to ensure that certificates are current, and that ownership data is accurate, reducing the risk of improper issuance and abuse. Additionally, shorter certificate lifetimes decrease the window of opportunity for attackers to exploit compromised certificates. This analysis explores these changes' rationale, potential impacts, and security advantages for why this proposal will be adopted.




FIGURE 3: REASONS FOR REVOCATION

Detecting Cypher Injection with Open-Source Network Intrusion Detection

by Michael Dunkin

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Security researcher John Lambert once said, “Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs” (Lambert, 2015), but attackers do not simply think in graphs; they can attack graphs using a technique called Cypher injection. Cypher, a language used to query graph databases such as Neo4j, is vulnerable to a class of attacks called query injection. Cypher query injection allows attackers to gain unauthorized access to graph data by injecting unexpected instructions into query input. Graph databases represent tempting targets because they support critical applications such as fraud detection, medical contact tracing, and the well-known security product Bloodhound. Yet, they are not as well-defended as traditional relational databases. Researchers published over 60 papers in 2023 alone about SQL Injection, the better-known relative of Cypher Injection that targets relational databases. However, the first academic evaluation of Cypher injection appeared only in November 2023, and as of March 2024, there was no publicly available detection for Cypher injection. This study describes a set of rules written for open-source network intrusion detection systems that can detect Cypher injection with an accuracy of over 90%.

Detection Efficacy by Subcategory




FIGURE 8:
EFFICACY OF COMBINED CYPHER INJECTION DETECTION SNORT RULES PER CYPHER INJECTION SUBCATEGORY

Active Directory: Tactical Containment to Curb Domain Dominance

by Christopher Tierney

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

More than two decades after Microsoft released Active Directory, the identity platform remains in use by organizations worldwide. Significant risks may exist in its implementation, administration, and configuration. With such widespread use, threat actors often aim to gain complete control over Active Directory, referred to as domain dominance. Once a threat actor has established complete control over the directory, this frequently results in the deployment of ransomware or the exfiltration of sensitive data. After a total domain compromise, containing and restoring control of Active Directory takes significant time, effort, and expertise. This research aims to provide a novel approach to curb domain dominance through a process referred to as *tactical containment*.



FIGURE 5: ACTIVE DIRECTORY ADMINISTRATIVE TIER MODEL

Unveiling PikaBot: Optimizing Intrusion Detection for Evolving Malware Threat

by Frederick Paterno

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

In addressing the evolving threat landscape marked by PikaBot malware, this study investigates the enhancement of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) like Snort and Suricata, focusing on augmenting their detection accuracy while minimizing false positives. Through a rigorous examination and analysis of real-world and synthetic packet captures (PCAPs), custom rule sets specifically designed to target PikaBot's unique behaviors were developed and meticulously tested across various traffic patterns. The findings reveal a substantial increase in detection rates by over 23,000%, alongside a meager false positive rate, underscoring the efficacy of the optimized rules in bolstering IDS capabilities against sophisticated cyber threats. This research highlights the importance of continuous innovation and collaboration within the cybersecurity community to keep pace with rapidly evolving malware threats.

Implementing the recommended optimized rules equips organizations with a strategic approach to significantly improve their security defenses against PikaBot and similar malware threats, contributing to a more robust digital ecosystem resilient to current and evolving cybersecurity challenges. Given the dynamic nature of cyber threats, particularly the rapid change in the relevance of IP address-based Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), it is essential to emphasize the value of continuous monitoring and rule updates.

```

2 [1:2013028:7] ET POLICY curl User-Agent Outbound
5 [1:2018959:4] ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP
5 [1:2021076:2] ET HUNTING SUSPICIOUS Dotted Quad Host MZ Response
1 [1:2025169:2] ET MALWARE Windows Executable Downloaded With Image Content-Type Header
161 [1:2028765:2] ET JA3 Hash - [Abuse.ch] Possible Dridex
1 [1:2031071:4] ET INFO Microsoft Connection Test
1 [1:2031231:3] ET INFO Observed ZeroSSL SSL/TLS Certificate
3 [1:2033355:1] ET INFO Windows Powershell User-Agent Usage
2 [1:2034567:1] ET HUNTING curl User-Agent to Dotted Quad
3 [1:2046046:1] ET MALWARE [ANY.RUN] Observed Malicious Powershell Related Activity (GET)
1 [1:2048249:3] ET MALWARE TA577 Style Request (2023-05-15)
3 [1:2049708:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
3 [1:2049709:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
3 [1:2049710:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
3 [1:2049711:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
3 [1:2049712:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
3 [1:2049713:1] ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (TA577)
1 [1:2210054:1] SURICATA STREAM excessive retransmissions
1 [1:2221010:1] SURICATA HTTP unable to match response to request
24 [1:2260002:1] SURICATA Applayer Detect protocol only one direction
11 [1:2404305:7139] ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 6

```

FIGURE 2: DEFAULT SURICATA RULES TRIGGERED BY PIKABOT TRAFFIC

Prevention Strategies for Modern Living Off the Land Usage

by Matthew Vorhees

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Usage of Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Actors has risen over recent years, culminating in a high-profile attack on United States critical infrastructure. Current threat trends from Detection and Response vendors have confirmed increased detection of LOLBin techniques, which indirectly confirms that enterprises generally do not prioritize prevention against threat actors using such methods. The availability of technology solutions does not warrant the lack of prioritization by enterprises, as tooling is available through Windows via AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control rules, and supplemental vendor solutions.

While there is an adequate amount of modern research and active vendor engagement in detecting LOLBin usage, research on the prevention of LOLBin usage in the contemporary threat landscape needs to be improved. There is value in building upon existing research work done on LOLBin prevention to consolidate, expand on, and test the effectiveness of these prevention controls as well as evaluate their useability if applied to both technical and non-technical employee workstations.

Usability Activity	Usability Impacted?
Installs applications through the Microsoft Store	Impacted: Unable to open Microsoft Store application.
Installs applications through a Web browser	No Impact
Customizes the host	Impacted: Unable to open native Picture applications.
Uses the media player	Impacted: Unable to play sound or video files through any default Windows applications.
Creates/organizes files in the file system	Impacted: Unable to open multiple default Windows utilities like Notepad.

TABLE 5: 11_BASE USEABILITY RESULTS

Whacking Moles: Blocklists and Their Role in the Endless Cycle of Malicious Domain Registration

by Shawn Reinhart

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Filtering out the evildoers on the Internet is an endless and often unavailing task. With millions of new domains registered daily, blocklists struggle to distinguish between the good and the bad. How much of the known Internet is evil? How long does it typically take for malicious phishing activity to be identified and verified as dangerous? Free and commercial blocklists exist to help organizations tackle the problem of phishing domains, but can such blocklists respond quickly enough to be effective? This research examines possible ways to answer these questions by combining data freely available from online sources.




FIGURE 4: DOMAINS FIRST SEEN IN SEPTEMBER 2023

Compromise of SHA-1 Certificate Thumbprint: A Reality in 2023?

by Barry Markey

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

A typical coding pattern is seen in online service APIs that make authentication decisions based on X509 certificate thumbprint comparisons. Typically, the thumbprint provided by the language runtime returns a SHA-1 hash for the certificate, but was not SHA-1 deprecated some years ago because of security concerns? Why are we, as an industry, still using it in this way? This question builds upon earlier efforts from 2017 that predicted a viable SHA-1 second pre-image attack would soon be possible (SHAttered, 2017). If it can be shown that SHA-1 hash forgeries are now viable, then this becomes a significant weakness in need of immediate action rather than just a potential future risk, as has been assumed to date. The SHAttered research findings (SHAttered, 2017) also introduced the capability to forensically detect files crafted to conform to a known thumbprint hash. That technique is powerful and has many applications but is constrained by performance and has never been applied to any significant degree to X509 certificates. This study improves previous analyses as it uses cloud technology to assess as many current certificates as possible. Additionally, big data analytical techniques are employed to search the vast online repositories of captured certificates for evidence to support this thesis.

```
private static String getThumbprint(X509Certificate cert)
    throws NoSuchAlgorithmException, CertificateEncodingException {
    MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1");
    md.update(cert.getEncoded());

    return DatatypeConverter
        .printHexBinary(md.digest())
        .toLowerCase();
}
```

FIGURE 4.3: JAVA LANGUAGE EXAMPLE OF SHA-1 CERTIFICATE THUMBPRINT CREATION

Using PowerShell and Other Command Line Tools for Windows 11 STIG Compliance

by Rudy Pankratz

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Hardening non-domain joined Windows 11 operating systems is a daunting task without automation. Non-hardened Windows 11 systems pose a security risk by leaving vulnerabilities open for malicious actors to exploit. Organizations must harden Windows 11 systems to decrease this risk. Using built-in tools, such as PowerShell and the command line, to update Windows 11 settings effectively reduces the human effort required to harden non-domain systems. It is possible to increase the baseline Windows 11 installation SCAP score from 36% to 97% with minimal manual effort. This experiment describes the overall SCAP scores of the Windows 11 baseline and the DISA STIG-compliant non-domain joined Windows 11 installations, outlines the code developed for each of the 127 failed findings and details the observations.




FIGURE 2: WINDOWS 11 HARDENED SCAP REPORT

Strolling Through the STIG

by Seth Butler

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The CKL file has become the unofficial common language amongst the Department of Defense activities to share and report on STIG compliance information. Although easy to work with individually (One System / One Assessment), this format fails at scale. STIG Management tools are available and actively maintained but often require additional servers to function. This research demonstrates how a new tool, Stroll, avoids the additional hardware requirements by living off the land. Stroll is a PowerShell module available on Github that automates the most common checklist management functions. This allows an Information System Security Officer to perform STIG Automation tasks at scale from a simple workstation.




FIGURE 12: VULNERABILITY LIST GENERATION COMPARISON

STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

Hunting the Hound of Hades: Kerberos Delegation Attacks, Detections and Defenses

by Douglas Benjamin Boyle [READ THE RESEARCH](#)

When misconfigured, Kerberos delegation in an Active Directory environment can lead to complete domain compromise. From its initial inclusion in Windows 2000 Server to its current implementation in Windows Server 2025, the Kerberos protocol has undergone refinements and design updates to harden its attack surface. However, despite these iterative improvements over more than a quarter of a century, the Kerberos protocol contains enduring vulnerabilities due to the nature of its design and configuration options. While numerous Kerberos attacks exist, from roasting attacks (e.g., Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting) to ticket abuse attacks (e.g., silver/golden ticket attacks), Kerberos delegation attack paths, including unconstrained, constrained, and resource-based constrained delegation attacks, remain some of the most lethal. This paper aims to equip penetration testers and red teams with a framework for approaching Kerberos delegation attacks and abuses while providing threat hunters and blue teams with practical techniques for detecting and defending against each attack scenario.




FIGURE 3:
DOMAIN CONTROLLER
COMPUTER ACCOUNT
INITIATING KERBEROS
EXCHANGE

“This paper offers practical guidance on assessing and strengthening Kerberos security in an Active Directory environment. The combination of both offensive and defensive perspectives on Kerberos delegation makes this paper particularly insightful. The focus on practical steps, such as enabling command-line auditing and hardening delegation settings, provides defenders with clear mitigations, while attack workflows help red teams replicate real-world tactics.”

– LENNY ZELTSER, FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR

Rapid Incident Response on macOS: Actionable Insights in Under an Hour

by Douglas Hitchen

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The increasing use of macOS in enterprises requires fast, effective incident response (IR) methodologies specific to those systems to augment conventional forensic methods, such as full-disk imaging and log analysis. Due to architectural differences, techniques for Windows cannot be applied to macOS. This research explores Aftermath for rapid IR on macOS. The approach produces relevant artifacts in under an hour for more efficient, better-informed incident response practices.

Technique Tested	Collection in Minutes	Analysis in Minutes	Evidence Found
T1056.001 - Input Capture: Keylogging	3.57	18.32	TRUE
T1059.002 - Command and Scripting Interpreter	3.15	14.28	TRUE
T1070.002 - Indicator Removal on Host	1.75	18.52	TRUE
T1078.001 - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts	4.57	17.58	TRUE
T1082 - System Information Discovery	3.42	15.87	TRUE
T1547.007 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	2.97	15.50	TRUE
phishing_post-chrome	3.37	15.87	FALSE
phishing_post-firefox	3.27	12.55	TRUE
phishing_post-safari	3.05	15.72	FALSE
phishing_download-chrome	3.63	18.95	TRUE
phishing_download-firefox	3.20	13.98	TRUE
phishing_download-safari	2.82	17.83	TRUE
Average Aftermath Collection and Analysis Time	3.23	16.25	
Percent of Tests with Evidence Found			83.33%

TABLE 1: TEST RESULTS SUMMARY AND STATISTICS

Cheap Malware Calls for Cheap Defense: Shellcode and Defense Tools on an SMB Security Budget

by Bryan Buckman

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Shellcode is classically valuable for attackers because attackers can load it into memory and execute it in various ways in contexts where it can often do considerable harm. However, it is vulnerable to detection and blocking by defenders because it takes relatively static forms, and the methods used to load it can be identified and intercepted. Modifying these methods takes considerable knowledge of Windows operating system internals, but several open-source tools are freely available to do it automatically. As a result, less skilled attackers have historically been able to obfuscate and deploy custom malware.

This research will examine the varieties of free and open-source tooling available for shellcode-based attacks and defense against them. This research will answer, by practical experimentation, the question of how these tools work and which are effective in multiple contexts. It will conclude that the defense currently has the edge in the contest between these two types of tooling, that free antivirus is presently highly effective at detecting shellcode-based malware despite obfuscation. Lastly, it will show that configuration and tuning costs likely outweigh any benefits of free EDR for this specific purpose. These conclusions are of particular significance to small and medium-sized businesses.




FIGURE 9:
MICROSOFT DEFENDER FINDS SHELLCODE IN
MEMORY AND KILLS THE INJECTED EXPLORER.
EXE PROCESS, AN EDR-LIKE CAPABILITY

Finding Lateral Movement of Adversaries Through the Noise of Systems Administration

by Brian Almond [READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Identifying adversaries lurking within the complex network of daily activities is a significant challenge in detection engineering and threat hunting. The intricate web of legitimate administrative tasks often masks malicious activities, creating a dense layer of ‘noise’ that complicates detection efforts. Systems administrators, responsible for maintaining and securing IT infrastructure, inadvertently generate vast amounts of data that adversaries can exploit to blend in and avoid detection. This paper aims to delve into the intricacies of distinguishing between routine administrative actions and potential security threats, focusing on standard lateral movement techniques. By analyzing patterns, behaviors, and anomalies within systems administration, strategies can be developed that enhance the visibility of hidden adversaries and provide recommendations to improve detection around common system administrator actions. This process underscores the inherent difficulties of detecting adversaries and highlights the urgent need for advanced detection techniques and continuous monitoring to counter increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.

Summary of Testing Lateral Movement via PsExec

Tests Attempted	Tool Tested	False Positives	True Positives	Detection Improvements Required
<u>PsExec</u> Standard Remote Administration	<u>PsExec</u> from Microsoft <u>Sysinternals</u>	Yes, Two false positives on SIEM	No Detection	Yes, exceptions for <u>PsExec</u> service and Lateral tool transfer via SMB
Adversary Lateral Movement via <u>PsExec</u>	Cobalt Strike with jump	No Detection	True Positive after rule tuning	No, once tuned, threat detection was accurate
Account Takeover Test of Lateral Movement via <u>PsExec</u>	Tested in previous tests	No Detection	True Positive after rule tuning	No, once tuned, threat detection was accurate

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF LATERAL MOVEMENT TESTING PSEXEC

Threat Hunting and False Negatives

by Jeffrey Legg

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The more complete telemetry captured inside a network, the more chance analysts have of understanding if an attack took place. Although modern endpoint detection and response tools have alert logs and additional full capture logs for an additional cost, what level of value does each bring an organization? Because each environment is unique, organizations should attempt to find a baseline their logging provides. This research examines the differences between the default alert telemetry and the full telemetry available for an additional cost. This research aims to evaluate the number of additional indicators of compromise that should be captured and the extent to which this practice approaches a 100% threshold.




FIGURE 15: TOTAL INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE PRESENT IN DATA SETS

Microsoft Defender and APT41

by William Currer

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Threat actors often target Microsoft Defender due to its popularity and widespread use. By default, Microsoft Defender is at the forefront of intrusions. However, it is essential to understand how well Microsoft Defender performs against tactics used by threat actors like APT41. Evaluating the effectiveness of Microsoft Defender can show how well it detects and prevents attacks like those used by APT41 or other groups. Microsoft Defender is sufficient for most consumer use cases. However, an EDR solution offers more substantial protection in an organizational setting than Microsoft Defender.

```

SHELL> Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://172.16.75.130:8000/install.bat -Destination
c:\Windows\Temp\install.bat
Start-BitsTransfer : Operation did not complete successfully because the file contains a
virus or potentially unwanted
software. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x800700E1)
At line:1 char:1
+ Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://172.16.75.130:8000/install.bat -Des ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (:) [Start-BitsTransfer], COMException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId :
System.Runtime.InteropServices.COMException,Microsoft.BackgroundIntelligentTransfer.Mana
gement.NewBitsTransferCommand

SHELL> Invoke-WebRequest http://172.16.75.130:8000/install.bat -OutFile
c:\Windows\Temp\install.bat
SHELL> Invoke-WebRequest http://172.16.75.130:8000/install.bat -OutFile
c:\Windows\Temp\install.bat
SHELL> c:\Windows\Temp\install.bat
Invoke-Expression : Program 'install.bat' failed to run: Operation did not complete
successfully because the file
contains a virus or potentially unwanted softwareAt line:1 char:1
+ c:\Windows\Temp\install.bat
+ ~~~~~
At line:1 char:488
+ ... BytesRead - 1);$Output = try {Invoke-Expression $Command 2>&1 |
Out-S ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ResourceUnavailable: (:) [Invoke-
Expression], ApplicationFailedException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId :
NativeCommandFailed,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.InvokeExpressionCommand

```

FIGURE 1: POWERSHELL SCRIPT EXECUTION FAILURE DUE TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS

On The Hunt: The Retroactive and Proactive Hunt for CTI Indicators

by Dennis Basilio [READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) has many standards and models to define it. However, very few of these standards reach a technical level of implementation and instead leave it to the interpretation of organizations. Hunting for CTI indicators itself needs to be a well-defined process. Most organizations receive a list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and conduct ad-hoc retroactive hunts for them within their environment for any historical hits. IOC hits are then proactively searched for in newly ingested data. The results should be saved to a dataset separate from the original data to avoid rerunning these hunts, allowing for a quicker review and longer retention, whereas the original data could age out. A standard hunt framework that accounts for retroactive and proactive hunts while integrating a separate dataset for IOC hits addresses the ad-hoc nature of these hunts.





FIGURE 9:
NUMBER OF EVENTS
SCANNED FOR EACH
SEARCH OVER
SEVEN DAYS

You Can Run but You Cannot Hide (In Process Memory): Observing Process Injection with eBPF in Linux

by Melissa Bischooping

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The use of built-in capabilities for injecting malicious code as a persistence technique is used by malware and malicious actors to compromise the security of Linux operating systems and evade detection by security tooling and threat hunters. Developing effective methods for detecting and mitigating process injection and code hijacking attacks is imperative as the widespread use of Linux grows and occupies a space in operations for critical infrastructure, cloud computing, and container computing. This research aims to investigate two techniques in Linux operating systems (malicious use of ptrace and of LD_PRELOAD) and identify detection mechanisms to enhance system security. Of particular interest are utilities leveraging Extended Berkeley Packet Filters (eBPF), which have been present in the Linux kernel since Version 4.1 and have more advanced capabilities since Version 4.9. Created initially for operational and performance observability, eBPF offers a lightweight, flexible opportunity for detection engineering



```
research@ubuntu: ~/ise-5901/example-pttrace/linux-process-injection
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
research@ubuntu:~/ise-5901/example-pttrace/linux-process-injection$ sudo ./inject
2711
[sudo] password for research:
[*] Attach to the process with PID 2711.
[*] Found section mapped with r-xp permissions.
[*] Injecting payload at address 0x55818f4a6000.
[*] Jumping to the injected code.
[*] Successfully injected and jumped to the code.
research@ubuntu:~/ise-5901/example-pttrace/linux-process-injection$
```

FIGURE 3.3: DEMONSTRATION OF THE PTRACE INJECTION BINARY ATTACKING A SAMPLE BINARY

Accelerating Incident Response: Applying Confidence Aggregation to Defensive Artifacts

by Andrew J. Russett

READ THE RESEARCH

Incident response plays an integral role in cybersecurity today. Despite the successes of the cybersecurity industry, the time between an intrusion and its detection remains relatively high. The following research is designed to combat the rising Mean Time to Identify (MTTI) security breaches and will explore the development of a tool to provide clarity. This tool coalesces an analytic assessment of the MITRE ATT&CK framework and provides confidence ratings for each tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP). This research will examine two threat groups through attack emulation, map the results to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and provide a qualitative assessment of each TTP concerning the attack chain. This assessment aims to clarify the pivotal time between when a breach occurs and when it is identified. By applying a confidence statistic across each TTP, a visualization of the attack can provide context to each artifact discovered. Combined with a tested threat emulation model, this approach can increase the confidence that a breach has occurred and prepare an incident response team earlier than traditional security operations alone.

Initial Access	Availability	Location	Tool Reliability	Confidence Rating
PCAP	Medium	Router Span Port	Medium	2
Suricata	High	Router Span Port	Medium	2
Sysmon	High	Host	High	3
Windows Events	High	Host	High	3
Threat Hunting Artifacts	Low	Everywhere	Medium	1
Zeek	High	Router Span Port	Medium	2

FIGURE 3: DEFENSIVE TOOL ASSESSMENT

STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

Shedding Light on OT Anomalies: Parsing Proprietary OT Protocols with Zeek

by James Clee

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Many traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) may struggle with the unique devices and protocols in OT networks. Proprietary protocols are more common, and they may not be able to be parsed by even OT-specific IDS tools. Additionally, many OT networks are particular to an organization, and defining what is impactful may vary greatly, even if the same devices and protocols are in use. When working with OT devices that can have physical impacts, their intended use must be understood to identify any deviations and potential dangers. By creating a custom parser built to extract the specific details of the messages in these protocols, a security team can identify what commands are taking place on the network, track patterns, and identify new devices or commands in use. This research will focus on analyzing the SEL Fast Message protocol using Zeek and a custom Spicy parser to alert on critical events and anomalous behavior.




FIGURE 6: BREAKDOWN OF SEL FAST MESSAGE EVENT BYTES

“In a field where the nuances of Operational Technology environments challenge even the most sophisticated intrusion detection systems, James’ research stands out for its precision and innovation. His work, which achieved a rare perfect score, methodically tackles the complexities of proprietary OT protocols and device-specific operations that are often unique to each organization that leverages them. By developing a custom parser to effectively analyze the SEL Fast Message protocol (using Zeek and Spicy), he has demonstrated the ability to monitor and assist with securing critical infrastructures against potential threats, even when tasked with custom OT protocols. The publication of his paper will surely provide invaluable insights to practitioners aiming to fortify their OT-based cybersecurity measures.”

– BRYAN SIMON,
FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR

False Data Injection Attacks Against Distribution Automation Systems

by Ryan McAndrews

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Utility companies increasingly rely on automated switching to provide their customers with a reliable electric power supply. These automation systems, which offer significant operational benefits for the utility, also present a growing security risk. With adequate knowledge of the function of these automation systems and their algorithms, an adversary could implement false data injection to amplify or hide real issues that these automation systems solve. An adversary would be challenging to detect without authentication, auditing, or appropriately logged field data. Researchers have proposed these attacks theoretically, and this research intends to evaluate claims of unidentifiable false data injection attacks experimentally.




FIGURE 4: MACHINE-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) DEVICE ADDED TO TEST ENVIRONMENT

Industrial Control System Internal Network Security Monitoring with Open-Source Tools

by Charles Carroll

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Security vendors have made many advances in internal network security monitoring (INSM) in recent years. Numerous vendors have developed specialized platforms that provide industrial control system (ICS) security teams with detailed network visibility. However, the cost of these platforms is prohibitive to smaller electric distribution providers and cooperatives. This scenario leaves these smaller but critical systems vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. While IT teams regularly monitor security, ICS systems have lagged in adopting centralized security monitoring. However, ICS security teams could safely leverage many well-established open-source tools in their environment to provide essential network security monitoring and asset visibility.

This research will demonstrate how INSM monitoring could be performed by ICS security teams using a single monitoring platform with multiple open-source tools, including Zabbix, OpenSearch, and Suricata, and deployed in Docker containers. These services provide asset inventory, intrusion detection, and server health monitoring with minimal hardware requirements. This research proves that while essential monitoring is possible, it is critical to understand the network protocols and device limitations to build a comprehensive monitoring strategy.




FIGURE 2.1: TEST LAB DIAGRAM

NextGen Bugs and Bytes: Navigating Cybersecurity Risks in Genomic Analysis Pipelines

by Alexander Marek

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Cyberbiosecurity is an emerging field at the intersection of cybersecurity, biological sciences, and biosecurity. This study systematically investigates the genomic analysis pipeline to identify the vulnerabilities within bioinformatics software that could impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of sensitive biological data. It employs a comprehensive approach to survey the threat landscape of genomic analysis tools and their security measures while assessing the practical implications of cybersecurity threats on genomic data handling. The investigation reveals several critical weaknesses a threat actor could exploit to compromise the genomic data. Based on this research, a tentative cyberbiosecurity risk management framework is developed. This framework addresses the unique challenges posed by integrating cyber and biological security, particularly in genomic analysis. Although tailored for genomic analysis, the framework is crafted with the flexibility to extend and adapt to broader cyberbiosecurity applications. This research brings attention to the need for improved security protocols within bioinformatics. It contributes a foundational structure for developing comprehensive risk management strategies within the nascent field of cyberbiosecurity.




FIGURE 10: SAST FINDING DISTRIBUTION

Exploring Infostealer Malware Techniques on Automotive Head Units

by Daniel Mazzella

READ THE RESEARCH

Automotive vehicles have become exponentially more computerized in the last decade, and automakers continue to add new functionality and integrations to these systems. While most research focuses on the safety features of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicle capabilities, there is little research regarding the data collected by these systems and whether this data is of interest to threat actors. By exploring exposed data, pivot points, and user impact, automakers and drivers can benefit from understanding how they can better protect themselves from unwanted data exposure and potential malware. The research focuses on threat modeling a sampled Android-based infotainment system, ascertaining what data could interest a financially motivated threat actor, and identifying techniques to demonstrate impact.




FIGURE 13: HCI SNOOP LOG - CONTACTS

Mode Matters: Monitoring PLCs for Detecting Potential ICS/OT Incidents

by Michael Holcomb

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

There is a blind spot regarding cyber security in many Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT) networks that support the world around us – in power plants for electricity, water treatment plants for safe drinking water, and railways for safe transportation. Many owners and operators of such environments remain unaware that Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, just like their IT counterparts. It is critical that plant operators not only understand how each of their PLC types function but that each is consistently monitored for changes that signal a potential issue is occurring. Such problems could threaten the physical safety of onsite personnel, the surrounding environment, or downtime for the operation. While platforms exist to perform such monitoring, many are considered unaffordable by today's small- to medium-sized environments. As an alternative, some environments might choose to have personnel walk the site to physically examine PLCs, an action that could put those team members in harm's way. This research will help provide a basic framework and sample tool for remotely monitoring PLCs to eliminate such a safety risk.




FIGURE 2: PHYSICAL SWITCH AND SOFTWARE OPTIONS FOR CHANGING OPERATIONAL MODES

STUDENT HIGHLIGHT

Protecting the Poor: A Deep Dive into EBT Skimming and Solutions to Combat It

by Anthony Vespa

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards provide individuals receiving government assistance for food and other necessities a convenient way to access their benefits for purchases and cash withdrawals. Unfortunately, these cards have become targets for criminals who exploit them through a method known as card skimming. This paper examines why EBT cards are vulnerable to skimming and explores potential preventive measures. A comprehensive analysis of the payment technology used in EBT cards was conducted to address this issue. Furthermore, real-world skimming equipment and techniques were assessed and replicated to identify additional controls that could disrupt or thwart such attacks. These methods were evaluated for their effectiveness in providing protection.

The findings indicate that adopting newer payment card technologies and incorporating enhanced security measures in payment systems can significantly mitigate EBT skimming attacks. Upgrading the technology used in EBT cards and reinforcing security measures can substantially reduce the success rate of skimming attacks targeting EBT cardholders.

"Anthony is conducting some interesting research into a topic that is not often covered and yet can have a huge effect on some individuals. Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards are targeted by criminals via methods such as card swimming. Anthony looks at multiple methods that can be considered to curb this type of criminal activity. Adopting new payment card technologies and security measures can reduce criminal activity."

– TANYA BACCAM,
FACULTY RESEARCH ADVISOR

FIGURE 20: HIDDEN CAMERA PIN CAPTURE



Revolutionizing ISO 27001 Audit Evidence Collection: Steampipe as the Ultimate Tool

by Franklyn Camejo

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

In the current landscape of increasing regulations, cyber breaches, and business risks, information security (IS) departments are under tremendous stress to effectively prepare their organization for yearly ISO 27001 audits. The most vital task to the audit's success is collecting the appropriate evidence from the auditee, demonstrating compliance with the respective security controls. IS departments can realize several benefits in automating this process, such as increased efficiency, faster audit preparedness, and simplified compliance. There are many commercial compliance platforms in this space, but they require significant cost investment and deployment time and can often require customization expenses.

The Steampipe tool is an open-source, no-cost solution that can provide the basis for consistent and automated evidence collection of ISO 27001 technical controls. This research discusses auditors' criteria to deem evidence satisfactory and compliant and how Steampipe can collect this data consistently and automatically. Moreover, a research test will be conducted with three selected ISO 27001:2022 security controls in two cloud tenants – Azure and AWS – to prove that Steampipe can produce consistent results regardless of the environment. Finally, the paper will demonstrate how Steampipe simplifies audit evidence retrieval and ease of use in data retrieval of audit evidence and automates evidence collection.

```
sinistar@DESKTOP-9F74BJB: $ steampipe query restrict_azure_rdp.sql
{
  "rows": [
    {
      "Inbound RDP restricted on all security groups": {
        "fail": [
          {
            "access_inbound": "Allow",
            "destination_ports": "3389",
            "region": "eastasia",
            "resource": "azure:///subscriptions/ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967/resourceGroups/Research",
            "source_addresses": "*",
            "subscription_id": "ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967"
          }
        ],
        "pass": [
          {
            "access_inbound": "Allow",
            "destination_ports": "22",
            "region": "eastasia",
            "resource": "azure:///subscriptions/ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967/resourceGroups/Research",
            "source_addresses": "*",
            "subscription_id": "ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967"
          },
          {
            "access_inbound": "Allow",
            "destination_ports": "5985",
            "region": "eastasia",
            "resource": "azure:///subscriptions/ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967/resourceGroups/Research",
            "source_addresses": "*",
            "subscription_id": "ccbed1b8-15b3-4424-bb23-a4d0913d4967"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

FIGURE 10: STEAMPIPE QUERY – RESTRICT_AZURE_RDP.SQL

Security, Cost, and Compliance in the Cloud for Medical Nonprofits

by Michael Wisniewski

READ THE RESEARCH

Most Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) are founded to serve or provide assistance to a neglected facet of the community out of goodwill rather than to achieve financial gain. However, NPOs often struggle to fund the resources or skilled labor required to maintain operations. These limitations open vulnerabilities in an NPO’s ability to safeguard critical operations information. Medical NPOs, in particular, possess rich data targets that attackers seek to have. Because of this, medical nonprofits must adopt a model that enables them to deploy secure and compliant applications cost-effectively. By leveraging discounted services provided by cloud providers, medical nonprofits can migrate their resources into a more dynamic and scalable environment than most traditional on-premises architecture offers.

INITIAL		OPERATIONAL (5yr)		INDIRECT		TOTAL COST (5yr)	
ON-PREMISES	CLOUD	ON-PREMISES	CLOUD	ON-PREMISES	CLOUD	ON-PREMISES	CLOUD
\$12,811.00	\$0.00	\$5,897.46	\$99,447.70	\$1,721.95	\$10,944.77	\$18,941.48	\$110,392.47

TABLE 19: ON-PREMISES VERSUS CLOUD COST COMPARISON

Hook, Line, and Sinker: The Best Free Tools to Catch Phishing

by Corrina Taylor

READ THE RESEARCH

Phishing has become a widespread threat that organizations and IT security teams face daily. As attackers continue to evolve in their techniques, it makes it more difficult for organizations to detect phishing. This threat significantly endangers small to mid-size companies without dedicated security teams or advanced phishing detection, making them highly vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This study aims to help bridge that gap for companies who need the necessary solutions to combat phishing emails by evaluating the effectiveness of free and open-source phishing URL detection tools and sandboxing solutions. This research will analyze each tool’s ability to identify malicious and genuine links over time. This study considers several qualitative and quantitative factors to determine the most effective tools for enhancing cybersecurity in a resource-constrained environment.

Performance & Reliability		
Tool Name	Score (1-10)	Comments
PhishTank	9.00	Generally reliable with consistent performance, though occasional minor issues.
URLScan.io	5.00	Not always reliable; some URLs can’t be scanned, limiting its effectiveness.
VirusTotal	9.50	Highly reliable with consistent performance across all tests.
URL Void	9.50	Consistently reliable, providing accurate results without significant issues.
ScanURL	1.00	Unreliable, with frequent issues in processing URLs and delivering consistent results.

FIGURE 4: PERFORMANCE & RELIABILITY FOR PHISHING URL DETECTION SOLUTIONS

The Open-Source Trap: Unraveling Open-Source Threats in the Software Supply Chain

by Clayton Boozell

[READ THE RESEARCH](#)

The risk to the software supply chain is increasingly clear, as breaches like SolarWinds, Equifax, Event-Stream, and recent PyPI incidents such as revive-jacking, the “ctx” package, and typo-squatting attacks, to name a few. There is a heavy reliance on open-source software that has the potential to incapacitate an organization if it does not enforce strong security policies. This research provides novel exploits introduced through malicious dependencies and packages that can bypass security features, resulting in a breach of multiple layered defenses. It highlights the urgent need for more robust security policies and defense strategies when relying on open-source software within the supply chain, especially in air-gapped networks. Detailed testing focused on finding vulnerabilities within open-source Python ecosystems such as the Python Package Index. Organizations that rely on open-source software repositories face severe risks due to trust in the software supply chain. Supply chain attacks introduce harmful code, weaken security, and disrupt essential operations.

```
user1@pypiclient:~/malicious_package$ python3 setup.py sdist bdist_wheel
running sdist
running egg_info
creating rev_shell_pkg.egg-info
writing rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/PKG-INFO
writing dependency_links to rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
writing top-level names to rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/top_level.txt
writing manifest file 'rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/SOURCES.txt'
reading manifest file 'rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/SOURCES.txt'
writing manifest file 'rev_shell_pkg.egg-info/SOURCES.txt'
running check
creating rev_shell_pkg-0.1
creating rev_shell_pkg-0.1/malicious_package
creating rev_shell_pkg-0.1/rev_shell_pkg.egg-info
copying files to rev_shell_pkg-0.1...
copying README.md -> rev_shell_pkg-0.1
```

FIGURE 8: BUILDING A WHEEL FILE

SANS Technology Institute offers
undergraduate and graduate programs on
the cutting edge of information security.



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